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I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Twigg,' the Third Circuit became the first
federal court of appeals to reverse a conviction under the "outrageous government conduct" or "due process" defense 2 recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Russell' and
Hampton v. United States.4 Specifically, the Twigg court found that
the government's involvement in the defendants' criminal activities was so extensive as to violate due process.5
Although its application of the due process defense was
completely faithful to settled precedent, Twigg has neither furthered the development of the defense nor discouraged outrageous police work. Nearly twelve years hence, it remains the only
post-Hampton6 federal appeals decision to invalidate a conviction
pursuant to the due process defense.
* Adjunct Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A., Drew University, 1980; J.D., Seton Hall University School of Law, 1984. The author is associated with the law firm of Robinson, Wayne & LaSala, Newark, New Jersey. He
wishes to thank Scott L. Fisher, Law Librarian at Robinson, Wayne & LaSala, for his
invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
2 As more fully explained below, that "defense" is not really a defense at all.
Rather, it is a constitutional doctrine that requires invalidation of a conviction secured through outrageous government conduct, irrespective of the defendant's
guilt or innocence. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). See also United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d
1428, 1432 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Strictly speaking, an assertion of outrageous conduct against the government is not a 'defense' because, if successful, it results in the
dismissal of the indictment whatever its merits.").
3 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
4 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
5 Twigg, 588 F.2d at 380.
6 Prior to Russell and Hampton, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a conviction secured through outrageous government conduct. See Greene v. United States, 454
F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). Indeed, Greene remains good law in the Ninth Circuit. See
infra text accompanying notes 177-88. Similarly, the Third Circuit reversed a conviction on fundamental fairness grounds in United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083
(3d Cir. 1975), a case decided after Russell but before Hampton. For a discussion of
the continued significance of West, see infra notes 117-22 and 150-53 and accompanying text.

606

DUE PROCESS DEFENSE

607

On closer examination, the reason for Twigg's dead-letter
status quickly reveals itself. Stated simply, Twigg's failure to take
root is the direct result of its subsequent history within the Third
Circuit. Although approved by the court sitting in banc,7 Twigg
8
was later rejected by a three-judge panel of the Third Circuit.
Given that inhospitable-and indeed, unauthorized 9 -treatment
by the very court that penned it, Twigg's moribund condition is
hardly surprising.
What is surprising is the Third Circuit's retreat from the fundamental principles announced in Twigg. Through that retreat,
the Court has placed its imprimatur on increasingly egregious
law enforcement techniques. With the court's blessing, the government has masked its inability to thwart existing crime by creating new crimes to solve and new criminas to punish.
This article begins by distinguishing the due process or outrageous government conduct defense from its poor relation, formal entrapment theory. It then traces the development of the
defense in the Supreme Court and addresses its rapid evolution
and devolution in the Third Circuit. Finally, the article offers a
simple prescription for revitalizing the due process defense in accordance with the teachings of the Supreme Court.
II.

ENTRAPMENT

vs. THE DUE PROCESS DEFENSE

While decidedly not entrapment cases, Twigg and its Third
Circuit progeny must be understood in terms of the ongoing
philosophical debate between proponents of the objective and
subjective theories of entrapment. That debate has its genesis in
the Supreme Court's 1932 decision in Sorrells v. United States,' °
the Court's seminal entrapment case.
In Sorrells, a prohibition agent posing as a tourist called on
the defendant at his home, accompanied by two of the defendant's local acquaintances.'' During that visit, the parties discovered that Sorrells and the agent had served in the same division
7 See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982).
8 See United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1983).
9 Significantly, under the Third Circuit's Internal Operating Procedures, the
court's panel opinions, like that in Twigg, are binding on subsequent panels unless
overruled by the court sitting in banc. See Horsey v. iack Trucks, Inc., 882 F.2d 844,
846 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Our Internal Operating Procedures flatly prohibit a Panel of
this court from overruling a published opinion of a previous panel.") (citing 3D
CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROC. ch. 8(c)).
1o 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
''

Id. at 439.
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of the service in World War I. While they were discussing their
mutual past, the agent asked Sorrells for some liquor. Sorrells
replied that he had none. The visit continued and somewhat
later, the agent again requested that Sorrells get him liquor.
Again, Sorrells told the agent that he had none, and the men resumed their war reminiscence. After still more time had passed,
the agent requested liquor for a third time. On that third request, Sorrells left his home and returned several minutes later
with a half gallon of liquor, which he sold to the agent for five
dollars. 12
Sorrells was subsequently indicted for possessing and selling
liquor, in violation of the National Prohibition Act. 1 3 At trial the
prohibition agent testified that he was the first and only person at
Sorrells's home to mention liquor. He further stated that his sole
purpose in going to Sorrells's home was to prosecute him for
procuring and selling liquor. Despite those admissions, the jury
convicted Sorrells and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 4
The Supreme Court, however, reversed Sorrells's conviction
on entrapment grounds.' 5 Injustice Hughes's majority opinion,
the Court made clear that "the defense of entrapment is not simply that the particular act was committed at the instance of government officials.""' Instead, the Court held that "[t]he
predisposition and criminal design of the defendant are relevant" 1 7 in determining whether he has been entrapped. Thus
"the controlling question,' ' said the Court, is "whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is
seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of
the creative activity of its own officials."' 9 Answering that question affirmatively, the Court declined to punish Sorrells for committing a crime " 'of the like of which he had never been guilty,
either in thought or in deed, and evidently never would have
been guilty if the officers of the law had not inspired, incited,
20
persuaded, and lured him to attempt to commit it.' "
Justice Hughes's majority opinion in Sorrells embodies what
has come to be known as the subjective theory of entrapment. It
12

13
14
15
16

Id.
Id. at 438.
Sorrells v. United States, 57 F.2d 973 (4th Cir.), rev'd, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
Id. at 451.
Id.

17
18 Id.
'9
20

Id.
Id. at 444-45 (quoting Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921)).
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is so named because of its focus on the individual defendant's
2
predisposition to commit the crime with which he is charged. '
Under that theory, if the defendant has previously committed the
specific crime charged or one similar to it, he is deemed to have
been predisposed to commit the present crime. Accordingly,
though he may have committed the crime at the instance of a
government agent, the crime is not regarded as the "product of
the [agent's] creative activity. "22 Stated differently, once the defendant is found to have been criminally predisposed, it is irrebuttably presumed that his predisposition, and not the
government's inducement, was the efficient producing cause of
his criminal conduct.2 3
In his now famous concurring opinion in Sorrells, Justice
Roberts adopted the majority's general definition of entrapment. 4 Echoing Justice Hughes's view that entrapment is procuring a crime that otherwise would not have occurred, Justice
Roberts described entrapment as "the conception and planning
of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the
trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer." ' 25 Thus, the majority and concurring opinions in Sorrells shared a common and central refusal to sanction government-induced crime.
Justice Roberts sharply disagreed, however, with the majority's predisposition-focused, subjective theory of entrapment. As
Justice Roberts explained, one who commits crime at the government's instance has done so "by supposition, only because of in26
stigation and inducement by a government officer."
Accordingly, Justice Roberts refused "[t]o say that such conduct
by an official of government is condoned and rendered innocuous by the fact that the defendant had a bad reputation or had
previously transgressed. '12 7 He concluded, instead, that "the ap21 See Whelan, Lead Us NAot Into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the
Entrapment Defense With a Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1193,
1203-04 (1985) (discussing the development of the entrapment defense).
22 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
23 As one commentator explained, "[e]ntrapment is a defense because seductive
police practices render the commission of the act involuntary. If the actor is
'predisposed' to commit the offense, however, the defense does not apply, since
someone already inclined to commit the offense is not effectively 'seduced' by the
inducement." Fletcher, Paradoxes In Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1263, 1280
(1985).
24 Id. at 453 (Roberts, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 454 (Roberts, J., concurring).
26 Id. at 458-59 (Roberts, J., concurring).
27 Id. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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plicable principle is that courts must be closed to the trial of a
crime instigated by the government's own agents. '"28
Although Justice Roberts's concurrence in Sorrells is often associated with the objective theory of entrapment, 29 it actually rejects the subjective theory without offering an alternative.
Despite defining entrapment as government inducement that
causes crime, Justice Roberts did not address the basic premise
in the majority's causation analysis: that a crime committed by
one criminally predisposed was necessarily caused by that person's predisposition. Instead, Justice Roberts simply rejected
predisposition as an unsatisfactory justification for inducing
predisposed individuals to commit crime. Thus, although he
clearly focused on the government's conduct, he did not propose
the objective theory of entrapment. 30 That theory, which does
address the causation issue central to the predisposition-focused
analysis, was first voiced some twenty-six years hence, in Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence in Sherman v. United States.3 1
In Sherman, a government informant met the defendant at a
doctor's office where both were being treated for drug addiction.
Over a period of time, the informant repeatedly implored Sherman to help him secure narcotics because, he claimed, he was not
responding to treatment. After many requests and constant appeals to his sympathy, the defendant sold the informant drugs on
three occasions.3 2 Sherman was subsequently convicted of selling narcotics and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. 3
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed Sherman's conviction on the entrapment grounds announced in Sorrells.34 Finding that the defendant was not predisposed to selling drugs, the
Court held that his conviction was instead the product of governId.
See, e.g., Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense,
73 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1014 (1987); Whelan, supra note 21, at 1209.
30 As explained below, the objective theory of entrapment holds that the government's conduct should be assessed not according to its effect on the defendant,
but in terms of its expected effect upon the average law abiding citizen. If sufficient
to induce a law-abiding person to commit crime, that conduct constitutes entrapment. See Carlson, supra note 29, at 1014. While Justice Roberts plainly deplored
government inducement of crime, he did not propose assessing the government's
conduct in terms of its expected effect on an average law-abiding individual.
31 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
32 Id. at 371.
31 Sherman v. United States, 240 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 369
(1958).
34 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
28
29
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ment inducement. 3 5 In so finding, the Court reaffirmed the predisposition-focused, subjective entrapment theory articulated by
the majority in Sorrells.36 As the Court explained, "[t]o determine
whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn
between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the
37
unwary criminal."
In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan
and Brennan, Justice Frankfurter-like Justice Roberts in Sorrells-decried the majority's focus on the defendant's predisposition.3 1 Unlike Justice Roberts, however, Justice Frankfurter took
specific issue with the majority's postulate that predisposition
necessarily supplants inducement as the cause of a defendant's
crime. He addressed that premise by noting: "[T]he possibility
that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition the
defendant might not have committed the particular crime unless
confronted with inordinate inducements . . . must not be
39
ignored."
While disapproving the informant's extreme inducement of
Sherman, Justice Frankfurter was careful to note his approval of
police detection of those engaged in, or ready and willing to
commit, crime. Specifically, he wrote:
In holding out inducements [the police] should act in such a
manner as is likely to induce to the commission of crime only
those persons [,]
and not others who would normally avoid
crime and through self-struggle resist ordinary temptations.
This test shifts attention from the record and predisposition of
the particular defendant to the conduct of the police and the
likelihood, objectively considered, that it would entrap only
those ready and willing to commit crime. It is as objective a
test as the subject matter permits, and will give guidance in
regulating police conduct that is lacking when the reasonableness of police suspicions must bejudged or the criminal disposition of the defendant retrospectively appraised.40
Despite Justice Frankfurter's eloquent argument in favor of the
objective theory of entrapment, the Sherman majority did not abandon the subjective theory articulated in Sorrells. Though many commentators have since endorsed-and, indeed, several states
35
36
37

38
39
40

Id. at 375-76.
See id. at 376-78.
Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 382-83 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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presently embrace-the objective approach,4 the Supreme Court
majority has adhered to a predisposition-focused theory of entrapment since Sorrells. Those found to be criminally predisposed cannot prevail on an entrapment defense, regardless of the government
inducement to which they were subjected.
Nevertheless, the Court's adoption of the subjective theory of
entrapment has not foreclosed judicial inquiry into the government's methods of investigating crime. To the contrary, the Court
has made clear, in United States v. Russell 4 2 and again in Hampton v.
United States,4 3 that due process considerations may preclude securing convictions through outrageous governmental involvement in
criminal activity.

44

Still, it is important to note that the due process defense is not a
strand of entrapment theory. Although its focus on the government's conduct rather than on the defendant's disposition has
caused the due process defense to be identified with objective entrapment, 4 5 the association is unwarranted. Indeed, the entrapment
and due process defenses proceed from entirely separate and distinct theoretical bases.
As both the majority and concurring opinions in Sorrel/s and
Sherman make patently clear, entrapment exists to negate a defendant's criminal liability when his crime is caused by the government.
Proponents of the objective theory ask whether the government inducements would have caused the average law abiding citizen to
commit crime. Proponents of the subjective theory ask whether the
41 See, e.g., Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent
Provocateurs,60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1114 (1951); Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the
Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE L.J. 1565, 1581 (1982); Goldstein, For Harold Lasswel:
Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84
YALE L.J. 683, 687-90 (1975); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REV. 871, 899-903 (1963); Whelan, supra note 21, at 1197. The
American Law Institute has adopted the objective approach in its Model Penal
Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(b) (1962). Several state legislatures have
also adopted the objective approach, see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-209 (1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-709 (1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-237(l)(b) (1976); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:5 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1985); 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 313(A)(2) (PURDON 1983); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.06(A)
(VERNON 1974); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1978), as have several state
supreme courts. See Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska 1969); State v.
Mullen, 216 N.W. 2d 375, 382 (Iowa 1974); People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 19-20,
210 N.W. 2d 336, 342 (1973).
42 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
43 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
44 See Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32; Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-89.
45 Indeed, Judge Adams's dissent in Twigg is premised almost entirely on that
association. See infra notes 103-130 and accompanying text.
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government inducements caused the particular defendant to commit crime. In either case, if the answer is yes, entrapment is
established.
The due process defense, however, is not a causation-based defense. Under that defense, a defendant's conviction will be disallowed where the government's overall involvement in his crime was
so outrageous as to violate due process. Whether that outrageous
government conduct caused the crime is immaterial. Indeed, a defendant's predisposition-irrebuttably presumed to be the proximate cause of his criminal behavior-does not preclude his reliance
on the due process defense. Unlike the wholly "inducement-based"
defense of entrapment, the due process defense is entirely "involvement-based." This basic but vital distinction has been clear since
the Supreme Court recognized the due process defense as one distinct from entrapment in United States v. Russell.4 6
III.

THE BIRTH OF THE DUE PROCESS DEFENSE

In Russell, a federal undercover agent was assigned to locate
the defendants' methamphetamine (speed) laboratory. Posing as
a regional speed distributor,4 7 the agent offered to augment the
defendants' supply of phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P), a scarce and
essential ingredient in the manufacture of that illegal drug. In
return, he was to receive one-half the speed produced. As a further condition of the deal, the defendants agreed to take the
agent to their laboratory.
During their initial meeting, the defendants advised the
agent that they had been manufacturing speed for several years.
In fact, when they brought him to their laboratory, they showed
him some speed that they had produced. Additionally, the agent
noticed an empty P-2-P bottle on the premises. 48 Approximately
one month later, the agent returned to the defendants' laboratory and asked one defendant whether he was still interested in
their "business arrangement." The defendant indicated that he
was, and would be producing some speed within the next two
days. Three days later, the agent returned to the defendants'
premises with a search warrant authorizing him to seize the contraband. 4' The defendants were subsequently convicted of un46 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
47 Id. at 425. The agent explained to the defendants that he was affiliated with
an organization in the Pacific Northwest that was interested in controlling the distribution and manufacture of speed. Id.
48 Id.

49 Id. at 426.
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lawfully manufacturing and selling speed.5"
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed Russell's conviction 5
on two separate theories. First, the court held that, irrespective
of predisposition, entrapment exists whenever the government
provides contraband to a defendant.5 2 Therefore, the court
found that Russell had been "entrapped" despite his clear predisposition to commit the crime of which he was convicted.53
Given its sharp deviation from the subjective entrapment
theory embraced by the Supreme Court in Sorrells and Sherman,
the Ninth Circuit offered an alternative basis for its holding. Specifically, the court held that even if Russell's predisposition precluded his reliance on entrapment per se,5 4 "'when the
Government permits itself to become enmeshed in criminal activity, from beginning to end ....
the same underlying objections
which render entrapment repugnant to American criminal justice
are operative.'55
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's ruling and reinstated Russell's conviction.5 6
Although the Court expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit's entrapment ruling, it disapproved the lower court's due process rationale solely on factual, not legal, grounds.
First, as the lower court seemed to anticipate, the Supreme
Court rejected its cavalier treatment of settled precedent-i.e.,
Sorrells and Sherman-which had denied the entrapment defense
to predisposed defendants. The Court held that to permit the
admittedly predisposed Russell to prevail on entrapment
50

Id. at 427.

51 United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423

(1973).
52 Russell, 459 F.2d at 673.
53 Id.
54 In acknowledging the problem posed by Russell's predisposition, the court
pointed to a prior holding in which it concluded that " '[e]ntrapment is shown
where Government agents ... exert persuasion of one kind or another which induces the commission of a crime by one who has no predisposition to do so.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Walton, 411 F.2d 283, 288 (9th Cir. 1969)) (emphasis added).
55 Id. at 674 (quoting Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 787 (7th Cir.
1971)). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit refused to acknowledge a substantive difference
between what it termed "strict entrapment" and the due process defense, noting:
[T]he only difference.., is the label affixed to the result. Both theories
are premised on fundamental concepts of due process and evince the
reluctance of the judiciary to countenance "overzealous law enforcement." We do not choose to affix a label to our result; hence we need
not select between the alternative theories.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
56 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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grounds would be to overrule Sorrells's and Sherman's common
holding: that predisposition vitiates entrapment. 5 7 Thus the
Supreme Court strongly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's reading of the law of entrapment.
By contrast, the Russell Court did not reject the lower court's
principal contention that "regardless of the significance of 'predisposition' as an element in 'entrapment,' . . . a defense to a
criminal charge may be founded upon an intolerable degree of
governmental participation in the criminal enterprise. "58 Despite disapproving the Ninth Circuit's application of that defense
to this case, in which the government had merely attached itself
to an ongoing criminal enterprise,5 ' the Court expressly stated:
"[W]e may some day be presented with a situation in which the
conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction." 6
With that
passage, the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of the
due process defense.
The Court revisited that defense three years later in Hampton
v. United States."' In Hampton, the defendant claimed that a government informant had supplied him with heroin and then ar62
ranged for him to sell that heroin to government agents.
Despite ample evidence of his predisposition, Hampton requested a jury instruction mandating his acquittal, on entrapment grounds, if the jury found that he had sold narcotics
supplied to him by a government informant."' The court refused
57 As the Court explained:
This Court's opinions in Sorrells ...

and Sherman . . . held that the princi-

pal element in the defense of entrapment was the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. Respondent . . . argues that the views of

Justices Roberts and Frankfurter, in Sorrells and Sherman, respectively,
which make the essential element of the defense turn on the type and
degree of governmental conduct, be adopted as law.
We decline to overrule these cases.
Id. at 433.
58 Russell, 459 F.2d at 673.
59 The Court noted that: "the propanone used in the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine not only could have been obtained without the intervention of
[the government agent] but was in fact obtained by these defendants." Id. at 431
(emphasis in original). It further stated that "[the agent's] contribution of propanone to the criminal enterprise already in process was scarcely objectionable." Id.
at 432.
6o Id. at 431-32.
6' 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
62 Id. at 486-87.
63 Id. at 487-88. Although there was considerable factual dispute as to the in-
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to so instruct the jury and Hampton was convicted. 64 On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit affirmed Hampton's conviction, 65 holding that
his proposed jury charge had been properly rejected because
"the Supreme Court's opinion in Russell forecloses us from considering any theory other than predisposition with respect to
Hampton's entrapment defense.' '66
Perhaps aware that Hampton had miscast his due process defense as the objective entrapment defense expressly rejected in
Russell, the Eighth Circuit went on to address the due process
defense he might have raised. In holding that Hampton had
failed to establish governmental overinvolvement, the court
noted that by his own admission he had carried out the heroin
sales "substantially on his own." 6 7 Hence, much like the
Supreme Court in Russell, the Eighth Circuit in Hampton acknowledged both entrapment and the due process defense-which it
awkwardly described as "an entrapment defense based on Government conduct, apart from defendant's predisposition. '"68 It
simply found that neither defense had been established on the
facts before it.6 9
In the Supreme Court, Hampton provoked three separate
opinions by the eight participatingJustices.7" Echoing the Eighth
Circuit, the plurality opinion, authored by Justice Rehnquist and
formant's role in Hampton's sale of the narcotics, Hampton rendered those factual
differences irrelevant by requesting the blanket instruction that entrapment exists
whenever the government provides contraband in a contraband case. Id. at 486-87.
Specifically, Hampton requested the following instruction:
The defendant asserts that he was the victim of entrapment as to
the crimes charged in the indictment.
If you find that the defendant's sales of narcotics were sales of narcotics supplied to him by an informer in the employ of or acting on
behalf of the government, then you must acquit the defendant because
the law as a matter of policy forbids his conviction in such a case.
Furthermore, under this particular defense, you need not consider
the predisposition of the defendant to commit the offense charged, because if the governmental involvement through its informer reached the
point that I have just defined in your own minds, then the predisposition
of the defendant would not matter.
Id. (citation omitted).
64 Id. at 488.
65 United States v. Hampton, 507 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1974), afftd, 425 U.S. 484
(1976).
66 Hampton, 507 F.2d at 835.
67 Id. at 836.
68 Id.

69' See id.
70 425 U.S. 484 (1976). Justice Stevens took part in neither the consideration
nor the decision of Hampton. Id. at 491.
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joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justice White, noted that Russell had "ruled out the possibility that the defense of entrapment
could ever be based upon governmental misconduct in a case,
such as this one, where the predisposition of the defendant to
commit the crime was established."'" As a result, the plurality
went on to note: "[P]etitioner correctly recognizes that his case
does not qualify as one involving 'entrapment' at all. He instead
relies on the [due process] language in Russell."7 2
Although distinguishing Hampton's due process defense
from the entrapment claim negated by his predisposition, the
plurality refused to recognize that defense. Ignoring Russell's explicit acknowledgment of a due process defense in cases involving outrageous governmental conduct, the plurality stated: "The
remedy of the criminal defendant with respect to the acts of Government agents ... lies solely in the defense of entrapment. But,
as noted, petitioner's conceded predisposition rendered this defense unavailable to him."7 3 The Court continued, "[i]f the police engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond
the scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the
equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police under
the applicable provisions of state or federal law." 7 4 Thus the plurality foreclosed the possibility that a predisposed defendant
could ever escape conviction on due process grounds, no matter
how outrageous the government's conduct in securing that
S1 75
conviction.
Significantly, the remaining five Justices who decided Hampton expressly reaffirmed the existence of the due process defense.
In a concurrence joined by Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell
noted that Russell did not warrant the plurality's blanket rejection
of the due process defense.7 6 While the concurring Justices
Id. at 488-89.
Id. at 489.
73 Id. at 490.
74 Id. (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974)).
75 The plurality charged Hampton with having "misapprehend[ed] the meaning
of the quoted language in Russell," which states that "we may some day be
presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so
outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from
invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction." Id. at 489 (quoting United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973)). The Court did not, however, offer
any alternative interpretation of that passage.
76 Id. at 492-93 (Powell, J., concurring). As Justice Powell succinctly stated:
I agree with the plurality that Russell definitely construed the defense of
"entrapment" to be focused on the question of predisposition. "En71

72
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agreed that Hampton's predisposition legally barred his entrapment claim, they rejected his due process defense on the facts,
not the law. 7 In expressly recognizing that defense, they refused
to retreat from the majority's ruling in Russell. Although noting
"the doctrinal and practical difficulties of delineating limits to po' 78
lice involvement in crime that do not focus on predisposition
and acknowledging the need for governmental participation in
crime, 79 Justice Powell declared that Hampton was completely
controlled by Russell.8 ° Therefore, the concurring Justices declined to endorse the plurality's revision of Russell.
In dissenting from the Court's decision to affirm Hampton's
conviction, Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall explicitly
agreed with Justice Powell's conclusion that the due process defense is available to predisposed individuals. 8 ' Moreover, the
dissent argued that the informant's involvement in Hampton's
trapment" should now be employed as a term of art limited to that concept. This does not mean, however, that the defense of entrapment
necessarily is the only doctrine relevant to cases in which the Government has encouraged or otherwise acted in concert with the defendant.
Id. at 492 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
77 Id. at 494-95 (Powell, J., concurring).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 494-95 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). Of course Hampton
was controlled by Russell; Hampton, like Russell, sought a per se ruling that entrapment exists, regardless of predisposition, when the Government provides contraband in a contraband case. In squarely rejecting that argument, the Russell Court
nonetheless acknowledged the limitations due process places upon governmental
involvement in criminal activity. When the identical argument was presented in
Hampton, however, the plurality did not merely reject it based on Russell. Instead, in
Hampton, Justice Rehnquist-who wrote the majority opinion in Russell-attempted
to rewrite Russell to hold that due process places no limitation on governmental
involvement in crime. Given the clear teaching of Russell, it is not surprising that a
majority of the Justices who decided Hampton refused to sanction the radical departure urged by Justice Rehnquist.
81 Id. at 495-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although the dissenting Justices
would have overruled Sorrells's and Sherman's predisposition-focused analysis in
favor of the objective theory of entrapment, they also relied on the alternative
ground of the due process defense. As Justice Brennan noted:
I agree with Mr. Justice Powell that Russell does not foreclose imposition
of a bar to conviction-based upon our supervisory power or due process principles-where the conduct of law enforcement authorities is
sufficiently offensive, even though the individuals entitled to invoke such
a defense might be "predisposed." . . . I agree with my Brother Powell

that "entrapment" under the "subjective" approach is only one possible
defense-he suggests due process or appeal to our supervisory power as
alternatives-in cases where the Government's conduct is as egregious
as in this case.
Id. at 497-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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offerfse was sufficiently outrageous to violate due process."
Hence, as in Russell, a majority of the justices who decided Hampton expressly held that outrageous law enforcement conduct
could violate due process irrespective of a defendant's predisposition.8 a That was the state of the law in 1978, when the Third
Circuit decided United States v. Twigg.8 4
IV.

THE MAJORITY OPINION IN TWIGG

Twigg was the unfortunate outgrowth of a cooperation agreement between federal prosecutors and a career speed manufacturer named Robert Kubica. In May 1976, following his most
recent arrest for plying his trade, Kubica entered into a plea
agreement with the government in which he agreed to assist the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in "apprehending illegal drug traffickers."8 "
That October, at the DEA's request, Kubica contacted his
ex-partner Henry Neville, with whom he had operated a speed
lab in 1973, to discuss setting up another lab. Neville expressed
interest and agreed to raise capital and arrange distribution while
Kubica undertook to provide equipment, materials and a labora86
tory site.
Over the next several months, the DEA supplied Kubica with
everything necessary to honor his arrangement with Neville. In
particular, they provided him with the rare and essential speed
ingredient P-2-P, twenty percent of the necessary glassware, and
the production site, a rented New Jersey farmhouse. Moreover,
the DEA arranged for Kubica to purchase the remaining materials from chemical supply houses under the fictitious business
name "Chem Kleen." He did so using money-approximately
$1,500.00-supplied by Neville. 7
Sometime during the set-up phase of the operation, Neville
enlisted the aid of William Twigg, who became involved to satisfy
a debt he owed Neville. Twigg's role was limited to accompany82 Id. at 498-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83 As set forth above, five justices in Hampton expressly endorsed that view: Justices Powell and Blackmun in concurrence and Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall in dissent. Three years previous, the Russell majority, which comprised Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, White, Blackmun and Powell, had approved
the possibility of the defense, as had Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall in
dissent. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).

84 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
85 Id. at 375.
86 Id.
87

Id. at 376.
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ing Kubica to the chemical supply houses, providing minor production assistance at the lab, and running for groceries or coffee.
Indeed, what little production assistance either Twigg or Neville
provided was done at Kubica's specific direction.8 8
The laboratory operated from March 1st to March 7th, 1977,
and produced six pounds of speed. On March 7th, Neville left
the farmhouse with the speed in a suitcase. Kubica alerted waiting DEA agents, who stopped and arrested Neville near the farmhouse. The agents then apprehended Twigg at the lab.8 9
Following their convictions for speed manufacture and related offenses, Twigg and Neville appealed to the Third Circuit.
In an opinion authored by Judge Rosenn, a divided panel of that
court reversed the defendants' convictions on the due process
grounds announced in Russell and reaffirmed in Hampton.9 0
As a prelude to his exceedingly thorough analysis in Twigg,
Judge Rosenn carefully noted, "[i1t should be made clear from
the outset that our reversal is not based on the entrapment defense. The entrapment defense requires an absence of predisposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime." 9 ' The
court explained that Neville's predisposition had been established by Kubica's testimony that the two had previously engaged
in the manufacture of speed. Additionally, the defense of entrapment was unavailable to Twigg because he was brought into the
92
criminal activity by Neville, who was not a government agent.
Thus, the court expressly approved the jury's finding that predisposition had been established and that, accordingly, the entrapment defense was unavailable.
That having been said, the court went on to identify the defense on which its reversal was based, the due process defense.
As the court termed it, "the nature and extent of police involvement in this crime was so overreaching as to bar prosecution of
the defendants as a matter of due process of law." '9 3 The court
observed that while the Supreme Court had yet to reverse a conviction on that basis, the police behavior at hand went well beyond that which the Court previously had found acceptable. The
88

Id.

89 Id.
90 Id.

at 373.

,91 Id. at 376.
92 Id.
who has
son who
93 Id.

An entrapment defense cannot be predicated on the actions of a party
not agreed to assist the government in bringing its claim against the peralleges entrapment. See id. at 381.
at 377.
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obvious inference was that, under existing law, the Supreme
Court would reverse a conviction on the facts at hand.
To support that assessment, Judge Rosenn meticulously examined the law and facts in Russell and Hampton. The court explained that legally, both Russell and Hampton had acknowledged
the due process defense though factually, neither had found it to
be established. 94 Then, the court carefully distinguished the
facts in Russell and Hampton from those in the case at bar.
To explain the law in Russell, the court noted the Supreme
Court's now familiar suggestion that due process would absolutely preclude a conviction secured through sufficiently outrageous police work. The court went on to describe the decisive
factual distinction between Russell and the case at bar, noting that
in Russell, "the defendant 'was an active participant in an illegal
drug manufacturing enterprise which began before the government agent appeared on the scene.' "'
Similarly, as to the law in Hampton, the court stated: "The
rule that is left by Hampton is that although proof of predisposition to commit the crime will bar application of the entrapment
defense, fundamental fairness will not permit any defendant to
be convicted of a crime in which police conduct was 'outrageous.' "
As to the facts, Judge Rosenn observed that while
Hampton merely involved governmental supply of contraband to
the defendant, "we . . . have before us a crime, unlike Hampton,
conceived and contrived by government agents.""
By contrasting the facts in Hampton and Russell to those in the
case at hand, Judge Rosenn identified the salient characteristic of
outrageous government conduct: extensive government involvement in crime from beginning to end. As the court recounted,
when Kubica reestablished contact with Neville at the DEA's behest, Neville was not involved in illegal drug activity. Actively
participating with Kubica, the agents "deceptively implanted the
criminal design in Neville's mind." ' 8 As the Court explained,
"[t]hey set him up, encouraged him, provided the essential supplies and technical expertise, and when he and Kubica encountered difficulties in consummating the crime, they assisted in
94

See id. at 377-79.

95 Id. at 377 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973)).
96 Id. at 378-79 (citing United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir.

1978); United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1075 (1977)).
97 Id. at 378.
98 Id. at 381.
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finding solutions." 9 9 The court continued, "[t]his egregious conduct on the part of government agents generated new crimes by
the defendant merely for the sake of pressing criminal charges
against him when, as far as the record reveals, he was lawfully
and peacefully minding his own affairs."' 0 0 Accordingly, Judge
Rosenn had "no trouble" concluding that the law enforcement
conduct in Twigg had reached " 'a demonstrable level of
outrageousness.' ''101
Despite Judge Rosenn's painstaking adherence to Russell and
Hampton, his opinion in Twigg was not unanimous. In a carefully
worded dissent, Judge Adams rejected the majority's holding
that the government's conduct violated due process. 0 2
Although Judge Adams's dissent purports to be a good faith application of existing law, it is a clear departure from Supreme
Court precedent. Nevertheless, that dissent has become law in
the Third Circuit.
V.

JUDGE ADAMS'S DISSENT

Judge Adams's design to create rather than apply the law was
clear from the opening lines of his opinion:
For almost fifty years the legal community has been divided over what a court's attitude should be when law enforcement agents are accused of encouraging criminal activity so as
to gather evidence for a prosecution. Such police activity is
generally referred to as entrapment and historically there have
been two basic views on how it should be treated."0 3
That having been said, Judge Adams went on to contrast the objective and subjective theories of entrapment.
On its face, Judge Adams's opening was merely an historical
overview of the issue before the court: government encouragement
of crime. On closer inspection, that opening performed a far more
significant function. While ostensibly informational, it was in fact
definitional. While purporting merely to introduce the issue before
the court, Judge Adams instead redefined that issue. Despite Judge
Rosenn's explicit statement, "our reversal is not based on the entrapment defense,"'0 4 Judge Adams's dissent from that reversal
clearly focused on entrapment from the very outset.
99 Id.

100 Id.
101 Id. (citations omitted).
102 Id. at 382 (Adams, J., dissenting).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 376. See text accompanying supra notes 91-93.
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After his introductory discussion of the two theories of entrapment, Judge Adams went on to note the Supreme Court's well-settled adoption of the subjective theory, explaining that "[i]t can no
longer be doubted that the Supreme Court has resolved this debate
in favor of those who wish to emphasize the accused's predisposition to commit the crime."' 5 The dissent continued: "When, as in
the case before us now, the defendants are found to have been willing participants in the crime, they may not avoid conviction by
claiming that they were entrapped."' 0 6
That conclusion, of course, was also drawn by Judge Rosenn,
who expressly found both that "the entrapment defense requires an
absence of predisposition" and that predisposition had been proven
in this case. 10 7 By restating those conclusions in his dissent, however, Judge Adams was able to segue neatly into his subtle mischaracterization of the due process defense as a slight variation on
classical entrapment theory. As Judge Adams wrote:
But the defendants also contend that even if they are foreclosed from resorting to the traditional entrapment defense,
the official involvement in this particular case was so extensive
that they were denied due process of law. The possibility of
scrutiny of law enforcement techniques under the due process
clause has been left open by the Supreme Court. The only issue
in this appeal, therefore, is what margin, if any, is left by the case law
for vindication under the due process clause of the policies voiced by those
favoring the objective approach to analyzing a claim of entrapment.'08
So framed, the issue determines the answer. As Judge Adams carefully established in the introduction to his dissent, the Supreme
Court has rejected objective entrapment theory. Accordingly, the
case law leaves no margin for vindicating that theory.
But that was not the issue actually before the court in Twigg. As
the Supreme Court made patently clear in Russell and Hampton, the
due process defense is not a branch of entrapment theory. Rather,
it proceeds from the wholly separate notion that due process places
certain limitations on governmental investigation of crime. Hence,
"due process defense" is not merely a new name for "objective entrapment," nor is it an underhanded attempt to vindicate the policies underlying the objective theory of entrapment." 9 Perhaps
Id. at 382-83 (Adams, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
1o6 Id. at 383 (Adams, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 376.
'08 Id. at 383 (Adams, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
109, AlthoughJudge Adams alluded to those policies, he never expressly identified
them. To the extent that the policies to which he referred require an assessment of
the causative power of the government's law enforcement techniques, those poli105
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most significantly, the due process defense does not turn on the
question of who-the government or the defendant-actually
caused the commission of the crime. Unlike both subjective and objective entrapment, the due process defense does not focus on causation. Instead, it invalidates a conviction when that conviction is
accomplished by governmental overinvolvement in the crime
charged. Therefore, the only issue really before the court in Twigg
was whether the government's role in the speed manufacturing
scheme was so extensive as to violate due process.
Judge Adams's detailed dissent, however, made no effort to address that issue. Having recast the due process defense as "the remnant of the 'objective' analysis left open by Mr. Justice Powell in
Hampton," "o Judge Adams easily concluded that that "remnant...
may be applied only to truly 'outrageous' cases"' '-which, in his
view, Twigg was not. As the dissent explained its conclusion:
Had a majority of the Court intended that due process review
of government involvement in crime should constitute anything more than a seldom used judicial weapon reserved for
the most unusual cases, it would have been more forthright for
it to have adopted the position eloquently urged by the minority voices in Sorrells, Russell and Hampton, instead of seeking to
reach the same result under a different rubric.'' 2

Under Judge Adams's construct, if the Supreme Court really
wanted to permit due process review of the government's investigative techniques, it should have embraced the objective theory of entrapment. Because the Court did not embrace that theory, reasoned
Judge Adams, it must have meant to limit such due process review
to the rarest cases.
Like the remainder of the dissent, however, that argumentwhich Judge Adams described as "a matter of logic,"' 3 -proceeds
from a faulty premise. Specifically, it presupposes that due process
cies are contrary to Supreme Court precedent and should not be vindicated. To
the extent, however, that those policies simply call for an assessment of the degree
of governmental involvement in a particular crime, they are perfectly in keeping
with the Supreme Court's teachings.
1to Twigg, 588 F.2d at 384 (Adams, J., dissenting).
III Id. at 385 (Adams, J., dissenting).
112 Id. Judge Adams further observed: "Due process analysis was not intended
simply to re-establish the objective approach to entrapment under a new name."
Id. at 383 (Adams, J., dissenting).
I13 Id. at 385 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams stated:
As a matter of logic this must be true if the decisions of the Supreme
Court in Sorrells, Sherman, Russell and Hampton are to have any force. For
once the Supreme Court has decided to eschew close scrutiny of law
enforcement techniques under the objective approach to entrapment, it
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review of governmental conduct is the functional equivalent of objective entrapment. As explained above, that is simply not the case.
While objective entrapment focuses on whether the government's
conduct would have caused the average law abiding citizen to commit the defendant's crime, the due process defense proscribes outrageous government involvement in crime irrespective of whether
that involvement was sufficiently substantial to have caused the
crime. Hence, the defense transcends the objective entrapment theorists' preoccupation with the abstract causative power of the government's conduct. Although proof of predisposition obviates any
inquiry into the proximate cause of a defendant's crime, the due
process defense involves a qualitative assessment of the government's overall role in a particular criminal enterprise. While not
necessarily the cause of a defendant's crime, outrageous government
involvement in that crime will bar its prosecution as a matter of due
process.
Nevertheless, having decided that a workable due process defense would constitute a "back-door reincarnation of the objective
approach," 4 Judge Adams set about keeping the due process defense unworkable. To that end, he seized first upon the amorphous
nature of outrageousness, noting, "it is difficult to know what standards to apply in order to conclude that a given course of action is
,outrageous.' ,,115
Turning to Hampton, Judge Adams found the government's sale
of contraband in that case more outrageous than its contribution of
non-contraband P-2-P, glassware, skill and a farmhouse in Twigg.
Nevertheless, noted the judge, Hampton's conviction was not reversed on due process grounds. 6
Having drawn that spurious factual distinction, Judge Adams
went on to criticize the majority's "reliance" on the Third Circuit's
would seem somewhat inconsistent for it to announce a new doctrine

allowing just such a review.
Id. Despite Judge Adams's citation to Russell and Hampton, the presupposition underlying his analysis-that the Court's rejection of objective entrapment theory implied a blanket refusal to closely scrutinize law enforcement techniques-is directly
contrary to those precedents.
114 Id.
I 15 Id. Judge Adams's dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's notion that outrageous government conduct could foil a conviction is evident from his reluctant tone
in undertaking to define such outrageous conduct. Following his acknowledgement
of the difficult nature of that task, he wrote: "Nonetheless it is necessary to begin
somewhere, and perhaps the best place to start is with Hampton itself." Id. Actually, the best place to start would have been where the Supreme Court startedwith Russell.
'I Ild. at 386 (Adams, J., dissenting).
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pre-Hampton decision in United States v. West,"' 7 stating:
The facts of West, as the majority notes, are virtually indistinguishable from Hampton. I do not see how we can rely on West
to tell us what is outrageous if the Supreme Court has determined in a subsequent opinion, and after specifically considering West, that government involvement in a similar perhaps
even more questionable situation, is not outrageous enough to
justify a reversal.'' 8
The majority, however, did not rely on West to define outrageous government conduct. West was a contraband case decided after Russell but prior to Hampton. In that case, the Third Circuit
upheld the defendant's due process defense where a government
informant had procured his involvement in a drug distribution
scheme and had provided him with the contraband which he ultimately sold." 9 Although the government conduct disapproved in
West was similar to that later approved in Hampton, the Twigg majority carefully noted that "Hampton may have attenuated West's applicability in cases involving similar facts." 120 As the majority correctly
noted, however, the principles announced in West "remain sound
today."''
Those principles are simple: " '[L]aw enforcement authorities [should not be] in the position of creating new crime for
the sake of bringing charges against a person they had persuaded to
participate in wrongdoing.' "122

Perhaps himself dissatisfied with his reasons for rejecting the
majority's vastly persuasive analysis, Judge Adams moved on to the
heart of his difference of opinion with the majority. First, as elsewhere in his dissent, Judge Adams recast the majority's reasoning
before attacking it. As Judge Adams explained, "[i]n finding a demonstrable level of outrageousness on the facts here, the majority is
particularly conscious of the government's role in instigating the
crime. "123
Having reduced the majority's opinion to a mere reaction
against governmental instigation of crime, Judge Adams stated: "I
do not believe that government incitement, however much I question its advisability, can be seen as the crucial element establishing
the level of outrageousness necessary to find a violation of the due
117 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975).
118 Twigg, 588 F.2d at 386 (Adams, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
''9
120
121

122
123

West, 511 F.2d at 1084-85.
Twigg, 588 F.2d at 379.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1975)).
Id. at 386 (Adams, J., dissenting).
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process clause."' 2 4 The dissent then gave three reasons for its belief that governmental incitement cannot be the hallmark of outrageous government conduct.
First, Judge Adams correctly noted that "there was government
instigation in Hampton and it did not lead to a reversal."'' 25 Second,
Judge Adams noted, also correctly, that "a claim of instigation or
incitement appears to be logically connected to the question of predisposition. "126 Finally, Judge Adams noted-again, quite accurately-that "instigation of a crime may be 'outrageous' in the
context of some forms of criminal activity but acceptable in the con27
text of others."'

If, as Judge Adams suggested, the majority had been "particularly conscious of the government's role in instigating the crime," 28
the dissent's three-pronged attack on the majority's analysis would
have been extremely persuasive. For if Judge Rosenn had relied
principally on the government's instigation in finding a due process
violation, Twigg would have been the objective entrapment case
Judge Adams read it to be.
A careful reading of the majority's opinion, however, reveals
that Twigg is indeed the governmental overinvolvement case envisioned by Russell and Hampton. The government's instigation or incitement of the speed manufacturing plan in Twigg was not the
majority's focal point. Far more significant to the majority was the
fact that, as Judge Rosenn observed, the criminal activity in Twigg
was "conceived and contrived by government agents."'' 29 As the
majority stated, " '[w]hen the Government permits itself to become
enmeshed in criminal activity, from beginning to end, to the extent
which appears here, the same underlying objections which render
entrapment repugnant to American criminal justice are
3 0
operative.' "1
124

Id. at 387 (Adams, J., dissenting).

125

Id.

126

Id.

127 Id.

Id. at 386 (Adams, J., dissenting).
Id. at 378.
130 Id. at 379 (quoting Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 787 (8th Cir.
1971)). Judge Rosenn is partially responsible for the dissent's mischaracterization
of Twigg as a "governmental instigation" rather than a "governmental overinvolvement" case. Despite his careful distinction between the due process defense, to
which predisposition is irrelevant, and entrapment, to which predisposition is fatal,
Judge Rosenn included the following statement in his majority opinion in Twigg:
"The only evidence that Neville was predisposed to commit the crime was his receptivity to Kubica's proposal to engage in the venture and the testimony of Kubica
that he had worked with Neville in a similar laboratory four years earlier." Id. at
128

129
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Hence in Twigg, over Judge Adams strong if baseless dissent,
the Third Circuit faithfully applied the due process defense the
Supreme Court had acknowledged in Russell and Hampton. Predictably, defense objections to outrageous government conduct proliferated in the wake of Twigg. Unfortunately, the Third Circuit's
response to that proliferation led to the subsequent emergence of
Judge Adams's dissent as the court's majority view.
VI.

TIVIGG's THIRD CIRCUIT PROGENY

The Third Circuit had occasion to reconsider the due process defense in United States v. Jannotti,' a case involving the infamous government ABSCAM operation.13 2 Injannotti, defendants
Harry P. Jannotti and George X. Schwartz were convicted of conspiracy to obstruct interstate commerce. Schwartz was also convicted of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). Finding that the defendants were
predisposed to commit those crimes, the jury convicted them despite the extreme inducements provided by the government. 133
381. As Judge Rosenn had expressly approved the jury's finding that Neville was
predisposed, his opinion clearly did not rely on a contrary finding. More likely, he
included that observation to bolster his general theme that the government's conduct was offensive. In so doing, however, Judge Rosenn unwittingly facilitated
Judge Adams's intimation that the majority had effected a "back-door reincarnation" of the objective approach to entrapment. See id. at 385 (Adams, J.,
dissenting).
13'
673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). After Twigg
but prior toJannotti, the Third Circuit was confronted with the due process defense
in United States v. Bocra, 623 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1980). Bocra arose out of a tax
audit in which the auditor befriended and subsequently accepted a bribe from the
defendant. In rejecting the defendant's due process argument, Judge Rosenn did
not discuss the defense other than to note that the auditor's actions were "significantly less egregious than the Government's activity in Twigg." Id. at 290. Accordingly, Bocra had no substantive impact on the Third Circuit's due process defense
jurisprudence.
132 Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 580. As explained by the Third Circuit:
The basic nature of the plan was that F.B.I agents posed as employees of
Abdul Enterprises, a fictional multinational corporation whose principal, a fictional Arab Sheik ....
was represented as interested in investing
large amounts of money in this country and in emigrating here. According to the government, the plan was "conceived to create opportunities
for illicit conduct by public officials predisposed to political corruption."
From the very beginning, the government utilized the services of Melvin
Weinberg, accurately characterized by the district court as a "career
swindler," who, with F.B.I. agents, "spread the word" that the Sheik was
interested in meeting public officials who could facilitate his planned
investments.
Id. at 581 (citations omitted).
133 Id. at 605. The Third Circuit noted that the jury's verdict represented a finding that "based on the evidence, including the observations by the jury of the ac-
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In vacating those convictions, the district court relied on both
entrapment and the due process defense upheld in Twigg.' 34
The Third Circuit, sitting in banc, reversed the district
35
court's ruling and reinstated the defendants' convictions.
First, the court noted that the jury's finding of predisposition
properly precluded the defendants' entrapment defense. 36 As
to due process, the court noted that a "delineation of the conduct circumscribed by the due process defense is, at best, elusive." 137 More specifically, the court remarked on the "tendency
for the due process defense to overlap with the entrapment defense, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's clear admonition
that they are separate and distinct."'' 3 8 Despite those limitations,
both inherent and otherwise, the court undertook to outline the
contours of the due process defense.
Tracing the development of the defense, the court restated
its holding in Twigg that, under Russell and Hampton, "fundamental fairness will not permit any defendant to be convicted of a
crime in which police conduct was outrageous." 39 Noting the
district court's improper reliance on government initiation and
inducements to support its due process determination, however,
the court expressly held that "a successful due process defense
must be predicated on intolerable government conduct which
goes beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment
defense."' 4 0
tions, words, voice inflections and mannerisms of the FBI agents, the defendants
were pre-disposed to engage in political corruption." Id.
134 United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d
578 (3d Cir. 1982).
135 Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 611.
136 Id. at 605-06. In a lengthy dissent, most of which was joined by Judge Weis,
Judge Aldisert expressed the view that the defendants were not predisposed to
criminal activity, and excoriated the government for the extreme inducements to
which it had subjected them. Id. at 612 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). In Judge Aldisert's view, the entrapment question should only be presented to the jury where a
fact finder could "reasonably infer beyond a reasonable doubt" that the defendant
was not predisposed. Id. at 621 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 606.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 607 (quoting United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 1978)).
As the court noted, the government did not contest the district court's holding that
a due process defense based on governmental overreaching "would be available in
appropriate circumstances even to predisposed defendants." Id. at 606.
140 Id. As the Third Circuit explained:
In Twigg, the first case since Hampton in which a defendant prevailed on
a due process defense, a divided panel of this court held that "the government involvement in the criminal activities of this case has reached a
demonstrable level of outrageousness." In the case before us, the dis-
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In holding that the government's conduct must "go[ ] beyond" entrapment to violate due process, theJannotti court fostered the misimpression that the difference between entrapment
and outrageous government conduct is one of degree. Actually,
the difference is one of kind. No matter how outrageous the government's conduct, that conduct cannot constitute entrapment if
its target is criminally predisposed. Insofar as the district court's
ruling was based on the government's inducements, however, the
Third Circuit properly reversed that ruling. As explained above,
outrageous government conduct, unlike entrapment, is not so
identified by virtue of its effect on the defendant. In sharp contrast to the objective theory of entrapment, the due process defense does not turn upon a showing that the government's
conduct unfairly induced or instigated the defendant's crime.
Rather, it is based on the overall degree of the government's
involvement in that crime. Hence, unless the government's inducements are accompanied by extensive governmental involvement in the criminal enterprise, the due process defense cannot
be established.
InJannotti, despite reversing the district court's ruling, the in
banc Third Circuit expressly approved the court's prior ruling in
Twigg. Moreover, the court did so while echoing Judge Adams's
concern that the objective theory of entrapment not be permitted
Although
"to reemerge cloaked as a due process defense."''
Judge Adams expressed that concern in his dissent in Twigg, 14 "
the in banc Third Circuit clearly understood that Twigg fostered
no such reemergence of objective entrapment.
Judge Adams, along with Judges Hunter and Garth, expressed their dissatisfaction with theJannotti majority's approval
of Twigg. Although relegated to a footnote in the majority opinion, the separate view of those judges bears elevation here given
trict court held that Twigg compelled a comparable result. The district
court based this conclusion in large measure on the inducements to which the defendants had been subjected, holding that "it is neither necessary nor appropriate to the task of ferreting out crime for the undercover agents to
initiate bribe offers, provide extremely generous financial inducements,
and add further incentives virtually amounting to an appeal to civic
duty."
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
141 Id. at 608. The court explained that "[w]hile the lines between the objective
test of entrapment favored by a minority of Justices and the due process defense
accepted by a majority of the Justices are indeed hazy, the majority of the court has
manifestly reserved for the constitutional defense only the most intolerable conduct." Id.
142 See supra notes 103-30 and accompanying text.
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the Third Circuit's post-Jannotti treatment of Twigg. As the court
noted:
Judges Adams, Hunter and Garth agree that United States v.
Twigg is distinguishable from the present case on its facts.
They would go one step further, however, and directly overrule the Twigg decision. They believe that United States v. West,

relied on by the majority in Twigg, the district court below, and
the appellees here, was implicitly reversed by Hampton v. United
States, and that unless further guidance is given in this area,
district courts, in a faithful attempt to apply Twigg and West,
with
will continue to reach results that cannot be reconciled
14 3
Hampton.
in
Court
Supreme
the
of
teaching
the
Despite the sentiments expressed in footnote seventeen, the due
process defense of Russell, Hampton, and perhaps most notably,
Twigg, was alive and well after the Third Circuit had spoken, in banc,
inJannotti. Given that fact, the Third Circuit's subsequent treatment
of that defense is nothing short of remarkable.
In 1983, in United States v. Beverly, 144 a three-judge panel of the
Third Circuit expressly rejected the court's prior ruling in Twigg. In
so doing, the panel-which included Judge Adams, along with
Judges Becker and Van Dusen-miscast the court's in banc ruling in
Jannotti, which had expressly approved Twigg.
In Beverly, a paid government informant introduced defendant
Dorrie Adams and his friend Robert Brown to Special Agent Darrell
O'Connor of the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
The informant previously had advised Adams that O'Connor could
help him earn a substantial sum of money.' 4 5
O'Connor explained to Adams and Brown that he wished to
hire someone to burn down a building owned by one of his friends.
He offered to pay Adams $3,000 to burn the building, provided Adams could prove himself to be an experienced arsonist. At their initial meeting and at subsequent meetings, Adams assured O'Connor
that he had burned several buildings, although he later claimed to
have been lying to secure the job.
Along with Philadelphia policeman Wayne McGlotten, who
claimed to own the building to be burned, O'Connor asked Adams
for an example of his handiwork. Adams showed McGlotten and
O'Connor an abandoned building he claimed to have burned. Both
later testified that it did not appear that the building had been
burned, and that the Fire Marshal did not have a record of any fire
143 Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 610 n.17 (citations omitted).
144 723 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1983).
145 Id. at 12.
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14 6
on the premises.

Before the fire was to be set, Brown withdrew from the scheme,
and O'Connor asked Adams if he had located another partner. Adams told O'Connor that he had recruited Lawrence Beverly, who,
like Adams, appeared to be in financial straits. Beverly advised
O'Connor that he had not previously committed arson, but that he
was willing to participate. On appeal, the Third Circuit would describe the denouement of this grand scheme as follows:
Following the purchase of a gasoline can, paint supplies
and hats (so that the defendants could disguise themselves as
painters), O'Connor brought Adams and Beverly in a government car to a service station, bought gasoline, ascertained that
Adams had matches, drove the defendants to a building
owned by the government, and looked on while they were
arrested.' 4 7
Dorrie and Adams were subsequently convicted by a jury of
conspiring and attempting to destroy a government building by
fire, 14 and appealed their convictions on entrapment and due process grounds. The extreme facts leading to those convictions were
eclipsed only by the stealth with which the court disposed of their
due process defense. Noting the defendants' reliance on Twigg "for
the proposition that fundamental fairness will not permit any defendant to be convicted of a crime in which police conduct was 'outrageous,' ""' the Beverly court stated that the majority in Twigg had

relied on West, which, in the court's view, had been limited by Hamp50

ton and Jannotti.1

The Twigg majority, however, did not rely on West.' 5 ' Moreover, the notion that it had, first raised in Judge Adams's dissent' 5 2
146

Id.

147

Id.

148
149
150

Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 1978)).

Id.

W1'est,
as in Hampton, government inducements
151 As previously explained, in
were the basis for the defendant's assertion of the due process defense. Noting that

"Hampton may have attenuated WVest's applicability in cases involving similar facts,"
the Twigg majority simply declared that "the principles in West remain sound today." Twigg, 588 F.2d at 379 (quoting United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d
Cir. 1975)). Those principles are as timeless as they are unassailable: the government should not create new crimes simply to bring charges against a person who
they have persuaded to participate in the wrongdoing. In reversing the defendants'
convictions, the Twigg majority based its holding on the outrageous government
involvement from beginning to end-not simply on government inducements. Id.
at 380-82. Thus, contrary to judge Adams assertion, Twigg is wholly consistent with
Hampton.
152

Twigg, 588 F.2d at 386 (Adams, J., dissenting).
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in Twigg, was implicitly rejected by the Third Circuit, in banc, in
Jannotti.5 3 For a subsequent three-judge panel of that court to hold
that Twigg had relied on West, therefore, was not only erroneous; it
was a clear deviation from binding authority. Nevertheless, that is
exactly what the Beverly court held.
If Beverly's dismantling of the due process defense was not immediately apparent, it has since become so. In 1986, the Third Circuit again addressed the defense in United States v. Ward,' 54 a drug
smuggling case authored by Judge Adams.' 5 5 In Ward, the defendants claimed that a government informant had proposed the marijuana smuggling scheme that led to their convictions. While they
admitted prior participation in drug distribution, they denied having
been so engaged when approached by the informant. The informant, on the other hand, testified that one of the defendants had "initiated the discussion of illegal activities."' 5 6 In addition, the
government alleged-apparently based on defendants' past activi57
ties-that it "aimed to infiltrate an existing distribution network."
It was undisputed that the defendants had "made active efforts
to promote the distribution scheme, "158 including the payment of
seed money, the securing of a safehouse, and the formulation of distribution plans. It was also undisputed that to facilitate the operation, the DEA supplied a Florida location that "included landing
strips, docking facilities, and other accoutrements of an organized
smuggling operation." 151)
In rejecting the defendants' due process defense, Judge Adams
153 TheJannotti court distinguished Twigg on its facts, noting, "[t]he facts shown
in Twigg, on which the district court relied, are not comparable to the government
activity in this case. There, the government initiated and was actively involved in
the operation itself." Jannotti 673 F.2d at 608. The court noted in footnote 17,
"Judge Adams, Hunter and Garth . . . would go one step further, however, and
directly overrule the Twzgg decision." Id. at 610 n.17. Had it been able to foresee
Beverly, the in bancJannotticourt might have added, "and a future three-judge panel
including Judge Adams will do so despite our ruling here."
154 793 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1986). In the interim, the due process defense was
raised and rejected on its facts in United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938 (3d Cir.
1986), where the court noted, "despite the holding in Twigg, this Court and other
appellate courts have since exercised extreme caution in finding due process violations in undercover settings." Id. at 945 n.6. Not surprisingly, the court cited Beverly as an example of such caution. Id. As Gambino did not address the defense
beyond noting the caution with which it is applied, it does not warrant further discussion here.
155 Ward, 793 F.2d at 552. The Ward panel also included Judges Weis and
Higginbotham.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 554.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 553.
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explained that since "the DEA's scheme entailed considerable participation on the part of defendants, it is not comparable to the completely government-initiated and government-operated plan found
in Twigg.' 160 The court concluded that " [t]he prosecution's efforts
to secure the arrest of two men experienced in drug distribution and
arguably involved in ongoing distribution activities accordingly did
not rise to the level of outrageous conduct violative of due
process."'61

Judge Adams's factual analysis, however, was not the most significant aspect of Ward. For before Judge Adams undertook that
analysis, he carefully laid its framework. Specifically, Judge Adams
approved Beverly's rejection of Twigg, thus perpetuating the confusion Beverly engendered regarding the due process defense. Reiterating the extreme facts in Beverly, Judge Adams concluded:
The facts in Beverly are quite similar to those in Twigg in a
number of respects-both criminal activities relied at every
stage on the initiation, participation and expertise of the government representative. Nevertheless, the Beverly Court declared: "We are not prepared to conclude that the police
conduct in this case shocked the conscience of the Court or
reached that demonstrable level of outrageousness necessary
to compel acquittal so as to protect the Constitution." ' 2
That having been said, the Ward court cited Jannotti for the
proposition that "[t]hus far the precise nature of the Twigg defense
remains unclear."'' 6 3 The court continued, "[t]he present case,
however, does not offer an appropriate opportunity to assay a clear
definition, inasmuch as it presents facts hardly comparable to the
egregious circumstances found in Twigg and to a lesser extent in
Beverly."' 6 4 Analyzing those facts as previously discussed, the court
rejected the due process defense raised by defendants.
Judge Adams was involved in every significant due process defense case in the Third Circuit from Twigg through Ward.'" 5 As a
result, Ward's apparently earnest effort to square Beverly with Twigg is
160 Id. at 555.
161

Id.

Id. at 554 (citations omitted). In this regard, Judge Adams contrasted Twgg
and Beverly as though their disparity was something he had recently discovered.
163 Id. at 554 (citing United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (in banc),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982)).
164 Id.
165 Specifically, Judge Adams: (1) wrote the dissent in Twigg; (2) voiced his opinion, along with Judges Garth and Hunter, that Twigg should be overruled in a footnote to the majority opinion inJannotti; (3) sat on the panel, with Judges Becker and
Van Dusen, that issued the per curiam opinion in Beverly; and (4) authored the majority opinion in Ward for himself and Judges Weis and Higginbotham.
162
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indeed curious. As Judge Adams was acutely aware, Beverly did not
reject the "Twigg defense" on patently outrageous facts due to any
lack of clarity in Twigg. Rather, Beverly rejected Twigg itself because
the Beverly panel believed that Twigg had been wrongly decided. Indeed, Judge Adams argued that Twigg had been wrongly decided in
and again nJannotti's footnote seventeen. 167
his dissent in Twigg,
In Beverly, his long-held view simply gained majority support.
Given that background, it was insufficient for the Ward court
merely to query as to the definition of the due process defense.
Although the in banc court in Jannotti began by noting the elusive
nature of that definition, Jannotti ultimately distinguished Twigg on
its facts. In declining to overrule Twigg, Jannotti made clear that
whatever the precise definition of the due process defense, government involvement in crime to the degree found in Twigg is
unacceptable. 6' 8
Rather than perpetuating Beverly's departure from settled precedent, the Ward court should have acknowledged that departure
and decided the case before it on the basis of Twigg and Jannotti.
Instead, having cited Beverly with approval, the court was content to
postpone "assay[ing] a clear definition of the due process
defense."' 6 9
The Third Circuit has yet to assay that clear definition of the
166 See supra notes 103-30 and accompanying text.
167 Judges Garth and Hunter also expressed that view. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 610 n.17 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
168 See id. at 606. Significantly, Jannotti noted the elusive nature of the due process defense before offering its detailed explanation of that defense. Specifically, the
court stated:
If the contours of the entrapment defense are imprecise, we have at least
been able to make an effort to delineate them. A similar delineation of
the conduct circumscribed by the due process defense is, at best, elusive. Part of the difficulty stems from the differing views by those who
must interpret the constitutional standard as to what are "immutable
and fundamental principles of justice."
The other difficulty lies in a tendency for the due process defense to
overlap with the entrapment defense, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's clear admonition that they are separate and distinct.
Id. at 606 (citations omitted).
That having been said, the court went on to trace the development of the due
process defense. When it had done so, the court distinguished Twigg, where "the
government initiated and was actively involved in the operation of the criminal enterprise itself." Id. at 608. Clearly, theJannotti court did not believe it left the due
process defense as hazy as it found it. As is equally clear, theJannotticourt believed
Twigg had properly disapproved the government's conduct in that case.
169 Ward, 793 F.2d at 554. The court's statement that Ward was not an appropriate vehicle for defining the due process defense was indeed instructive. Had the
court not chosen to leave the defense in the amorphous, "we'll know it when we see
it" realm, it could simply have reiterated the overinvolvement factors set forth in
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due process defense. Instead, the court has been content to reiterate that the contours of the defense remain "at best, elusive,"' 7 0 and
to note that it requires "intolerable government conduct which goes
beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment defense."''
That,
along with the disruptive teaching of Beverly and Ward, describes the
present status of the due process defense in the Third Circuit.
VII.

THE IMPACT OF TWIGG

Given the Third Circuit's treatment of the due process defense in Beverly and Ward, the court's recent refusal to revisit that
defense is particularly unfortunate. In addition to leaving the
district courts of this circuit without appropriate guidance as to
the status of the defense,' 7 2 Twigg's Third Circuit progeny has
Twigg. That those factors may not have been satisfied in Ward was not a satisfactory
reason to eschew their articulation.
170 See United States v. Martino, 825 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1987). In Martino, the
government issued a subpoena to defendants Martino and Caputo and to an FBI
undercover agent named Wayne Hess, in his undercover name. After both defendants testified before the grand jury, they met with Hess, informed him of their testimony and told him what to say. Id. at 756. The grand jury subsequently returned a
16 count indictment against Martino and Caputo. Id. The district court dismissed
two counts of the indictment on the basis that issuance of the subpoena to Hess
constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 757. In reversing that determination,
the Third Circuit rejected the due process defense. Id. at 763.
171 Id. See also United States v. Driscoll, 852 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1988). In Driscoll,
the Postal Service solicited the defendant's interest in child pornography, mailed
the magazines he ordered, and prosecuted him for receiving child pornography. Id.
at 85. The court rejected the defendant's due process defense, reiterating that such
defense "must be predicated on intolerable government conduct which goes beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment defense." Id. at 86 (citation omitted).
The court also rejected out of hand the defendant's due process argument in
United States v.Engler, 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986), a Migratory Bird Treaty Act
and explosives case. There, the Government's involvement was apparently limited
to its agents' request to purchase, and their actual purchases of, birds and explosives from the defendant. Id. at 429-30. Like Mlartino and Gambino, Driscoll and Engler did not significantly affect the Third Circuit's definition of the due process
defense.
172 Despite that lack of guidance, one Third Circuit district court has invalidated
a conviction on due process grounds. See United States v. Gardner, 658 F. Supp.
1573 (W.D. Pa. 1987). In Gardner,a government agent posing as a postal worker in
a Pittsburgh post office befriended defendant Sam Gardner and, on many occasions, requested that Gardner obtain cocaine for him. Id. at 1574. Over a period of
time, the government agent persuaded and induced Gardner to obtain drugs for
him. Id. at 1575. While reluctant at first, the defendant did obtain the narcotics as
a result of the agent's persistence, although he made no money on the transaction
and merely acted as a go-between. Id. The defendant was subsequently convicted
of distributing cocaine. Acknowledging the continued vitality of the due process
defense upheld in Twigg, Judge Simmons reversed the conviction, ruling that Gardner was "badgered, implored, inveigled and purposely set up" by a government
agent in order to prosecute the crime. Id. at 1576. Despite its citation to Twigg, the
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had a considerable impact on the other courts of appeals.
That impact has taken two general forms. First, because
Twigg invalidated a conviction on outrageous government conduct grounds, it is widely invoked by criminal defendants in every
circuit. 73 Due at least in part to the Third Circuit's subsequent
failure to develop that defense, however, most courts-with notable exceptions' 74-routinely reject it out of hand whenever it is
invoked.' 75 Indeed, in so doing, several courts have expressly
Gardner court relied principally upon the Ninth Circuit's analysis in United States v.
Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986) and United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535,
539 (9th Cir. 1983). Specifically, the court determined that the government had
created rather than uncovered defendant's crime, thus engineering his "criminal
enterprise from start to finish." Gardner, 658 F. Supp. at 1576 (citing United States
v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983)).
173 See, e.g., United States v. Milam, 817 F.2d 1113 (4th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. So, 755 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1985); United States v. Belzer, 743 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Gamble, 737 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290 (8th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v.
Romano, 706 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Butera, 677 F.2d 1376 (11 th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1980).
174 See, e.g., United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Twigg in support of the court's view "that a crime manufactured by the government 'from whole cloth' would constitute outrageous conduct"); United States v.
Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (8th Cir. 1984) (reversing defendant's conviction on
entrapment grounds but citing Twigg for the proposition that the government's
overinvolvement in the crime also approached a due process violation); United
States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Twigg for the proposition
that "the government may not instigate the criminal activity, provide the place,
equipment supplies and know-how, and run the entire operation with only meager
assistance from the defendants without violating fundamental fairness").
175 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 858 F.2d 1218, 1225 (7th Cir. 1988) (defense rejected although government informant orchestrated scheme to obstruct
justice and jeopardized safety of many people); United States v. Milam, 817 F.2d
1113, 1114 (4th Cir. 1987) (defense rejected although government agent helped
transport printing press, provided counterfeit plates, bought necessary paper and
provided technical counterfeiting assistance); United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 45 (1st Cir. 1985) (defense rejected despite government informant's substantial involvement in drug distribution scheme); United States v. Warren, 747 F.2d 1339,
1340 (10th Cir. 1984) (defense rejected although postal inspectors engineered
elaborate scheme to procure insurance fraud by doctors and lawyers); United States
v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 856-60 (10th Cir. 1984) (defense rejected despite government officials' falsification of documents and tickets, and entering of guilty pleas to
false charges using assumed names); United States v. Burrell, 720 F.2d 1488, 1494
(10th Cir. 1983) (defense rejected although government officials offered to sell
food stamps to innocent defendant); United States v. Monaco, 700 F.2d 577, 58081 (10th Cir. 1980) (defense rejected where government officials allowed defendant
to engage in prostitution and to use drugs); United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146,
147-50 (10th Cir.) (defense rejected where government informer "held pot parties"
for defendant), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975).
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noted the Third Circuit's retreat from Twigg.' 7 6 As a result,
although the Third Circuit was the first court of appeals to uphold the due process defense, its overriding effect has been to
hamper the development of that defense.
While most circuits share the Third Circuit's post-Twigg,
hands off approach to outrageous government conduct, however,
the Ninth Circuit has evolved a workable due process defense. In
addressing the defense, the Ninth Circuit has exhibited a marked
refusal to adopt the Third Circuit's view that a definition of outrageous police work must remain "at best, elusive." By refusing
to settle for imprecision in that important area, the Ninth Circuit
has articulated a due process defense which the Third Circuit
would do well to emulate.
The Ninth Circuit's approach is most clearly stated in United
States v. Bogart. 177 Bogart arose out of parallel investigations into
defendant Bogart's role in alleged real estate fraud schemes in
California and in Utah. Following an exchange of information
between government investigators in the two locations, Utah authorities arrested Bogart four times in six months on various
"charges whose merits are open to question."''71 Unable to raise
bails ranging from $50,000 to $400,000 on those charges, Bogart
remained in custody in Utah awaiting trial for all but two days
between October 25th, 1983 and March 16th, 1984.
-While Bogart was in custody, Utah authorities convinced one
of his business partners to become a paid police informant. At
the direction of the San Diego police, the informant then convinced Bogart to become involved, through intermediaries, in a
conspiracy to sell cocaine. Bogart and the intermediaries were
subsequently prosecuted on narcotics conspiracy and related
79
charges. 1
In moving to dismiss the indictment for outrageous government conduct, the defendants asserted that Utah and California
authorities had "collusively engineered a series of meritless ar176 See, e.g., United States v. Milam, 817 F.2d 1113, 1115 n.2 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Because it relies on pre-Hampton cases, Twigg has been questioned by [United States v.
Beverly]."); United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 9 n.4 (lst Cir. 1985) ("[T]he Third
Circuit, in United States v. Beverly, has stated that the majority in Twigg relied on
United States v. West, which according to their view has been limited by Hampton and
United States v.Jannotti."); United States v. Belzer, 743 F.2d 1213, 1218 n.5 (7th Cir.
1984) ("[W]e note that there is a significant question as to whether Twigg is still
good law in the Third Circuit.").
177 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986).
178 Id. at 1430.
179

Id.
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rests and excessive bail requests ' ' 8 ° to keep Bogart in custody.
According to defendants, the authorities then manufactured the
cocaine transaction when they were unable to find evidence of
the real estate fraud they were investigating.
The government, however, denied any collusion between
Utah and California authorities. Instead, the government
claimed that the charges against Bogart were brought by Utah
authorities acting on their own and that the bails set were either
proper or were caused by "clerical mistake."18' The government
further claimed that its cocaine scheme was designed to trap a
Utah prison guard who had befriended Bogart, and that Bogart
himself had conceived the cocaine scheme for which he was
indicted. 8 '
Although the district court denied defendants' motion, the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for further factual
development.' 8 3 Correctly distinguishing the due process defense from the entrapment defense barred by Bogart's criminal
predisposition, the court noted, "[w]e have repeatedly held that
the due process outrageous conduct defense 'survived the

Court's review in Hampton.'

"184

Then, like the courts in nearly every case involving that defense, the Ninth Circuit cited Twigg as the only post-Hampton
court of appeals decision in which the defense was successfully
employed.' 8 5 Unlike many courts, however, the Ninth Circuit
neither suggested that Twigg was no longer valid nor ruled that it
should be limited to its facts. Instead, despite noting that in Beverly the Third Circuit questioned the legal reasoning on which
Twigg was based, the court accurately observed that inJannotti, "a
plurality of the court sitting in banc reaffirmed the continued vitality of Twigg.'"
The Ninth Circuit went on to draw a vital distinction between Twigg and the many cases to reject the due process defense. As the court succinctly noted, "the numerous cases
refusing to apply the outrageous conduct defense invariably con180 Id.
181 Id. at 1431.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 1433.
184 Id. at 1432
185 Id. at 1434.

(citations omitted).
The court noted, however, that the Ninth Circuit dismissed an
indictment on due process grounds in Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th
Cir. 1971), a case decided prior to Hampton and Russell. See Bogart, 783 F.2d at
1434.
18(i Id. at 1434 n.5.
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clude that when the government conduct occurred, the defendant was involved in a continuing series of similar crimes, or that
the charged criminal enterprise was already in progress at the
time the government agent became involved."' 8 7 The court
continued:
The outrageous governmental conduct defense involves a difficult area of the law. Drawing a bright line with any degree of
assurance is fraught with problems. The point of division at
the margins between police conduct that is just acceptable and
that which goes a fraction too far probably cannot be usefully
defined in the abstract. Ultimately, every case must be resolved on its own particular facts. However, some general observations are possible.'8 8
Thus, despite acknowledging the difficulties inherent in defining the due process defense, the Ninth Circuit-in sharp contrast to
the Third Circuit-was not content to let a definition of the defense
"remain[], at best, elusive." Rather, the court proceeded to identify
the fundamental distinction between acceptable and unacceptable
conduct. First, the court stated the general rule that the government may permissibly "use 'artifice and stratagem to ferret our
criminal activity.' "189 More specifically, the court noted that the
government may use paid informants, supply contraband to gain defendants' confidence, provide items necessary and valuable to an existing conspiracy, infiltrate an existing criminal organization, and
approach those presently engaged in or contemplating criminal
conduct. 9 °
By contrast, the court decried police conduct involving "unwarMore signifiranted physical, or perhaps mental, coercion."''
cantly, the court described as unconstitutional "those hopefully few
cases where the crime is fabricated entirely by the police to secure the
defendants' conviction rather than to protect the public from the
defendants' continuing criminal behavior."l"2
Having articulated those legal guidelines, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss
and remanded the case to the lower court for findings of fact. On
remand, the district court was instructed to apply the guidelines to
the facts in order to determine whether the government's conduct
187 Id. at 1437 (emphasis in original).
188 Id. at 1438.
189 Id. (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932)).
190 Id. (citations omitted).
I) Id.
192 Id. (emphasis in original).
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violated due process.' 9 3
In the past three years, the Ninth Circuit has on numerous occasions reaffirmed the due process defense guidelines announced in
Bogart.'9 4 Those decisions, unlike recent Third Circuit rulings in
the area, found the defense neither hazy nor elusive. Rather, they
clearly and carefully applied Bogart to approve the government's
conduct.
That is not to suggest that the Ninth Circuit has conceived a
rigid formula for determining whether particular government conduct is outrageous. By its very terms, Bogart prescribes a flexible,
case by case assessment of the challenged conduct.
The Ninth Circuit has, however, devised a workable framework
for conducting that assessment. Rather than permitting the outrageous conduct standard to remain amorphous and hence unattainable, the Ninth Circuit has defined such conduct in terms of the
nature and extent of the government's role in a particular criminal
enterprise. By deeming it outrageous for the government either to
physically or mentally coerce crime or to engineer and direct a criminal enterprise from start to finish, the Ninth Circuit has properly
focused the due process inquiry on the degree of government involvement in a crime. As interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, outrageous government conduct is neither mere inducement nor
something completely beyond the court's conception. Perhaps rare,
it is nonetheless identifiable. Hence, despite its amorphousness in
the Third Circuit, the due process defense has taken shape in the
Ninth Circuit. '95
193

Id.

See, e.g., United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Pemberton, 853 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Bonanno, 852 F.2d
434 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Wolf, 813 F.2d
970 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Stenberg, 803 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. McQuisten,
795 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wiley, 794 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986).
195 The Sixth Circuit has also developed a test for assessing claims of outrageous
government conduct. Specifically, that court has identified the following factors to
be considered: "(1) the need for the type of government conduct in relationship to
the criminal activity; (2) the preexistence of a criminal enterprise; (3) the level of
the direction or control of the criminal enterprise by the government; and (4) the
impact of the government activity to create the commission of the criminal activity." United States v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 199, 305 (6th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). While those factors-particularly the fourth--do not reflect the Ninth
Circuit's clear understanding of the due process defense, neither do they bespeak
the Third Circuit's refusal to address that defense.
194
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CONCLUSION

That the Third Circuit must clarify its position on the due
process defense cannot seriously be questioned. In light of the
Supreme Court's rulings in Russell and Hampton, overruling Twigg
is not an option. As explained above, Twigg was merely a faithful
application of those precedents. Moreover, the Third Circuit's in
banc decision inJannotti expressly acknowledged Twigg's vitality.
Accordingly, it is now incumbent on the court to reembrace
Twigg and the due process defense articulated therein. To do so,
the court must necessarily disavow Beverly's unauthorized retreat
from that defense. Stated simply, the court must acknowledge
that it erred in Beverly.
It will not suffice, however, to reinstate the Twigg defense as
an amorphous and hence useless doctrine to be raised and rejected with equal frequency. If the Third Circuit is to honor both
the Supreme Court's and its own binding decisions in the area, it
must adopt a meaningful due process test-one that will encourage valid, fruitful undercover work even as it proscribes the
senseless fabrication of crime and convictions.
From Judge Adams's dissent in Twigg through the court's
majority opinion in Beverly, the Third Circuit expressed its justified concern that the due process defense not become a "backdoor reincarnation" of the objective theory of entrapment. In
keeping with that concern, the court has understandably struggled to resist an inducement-focused approach to the due process defense.
In Bogart and its progeny, the Ninth Circuit has properly focused the due process inquiry on the nature and extent of the
government's involvement in criminal activity rather than on the
fact of its inducement to commit crime. In so doing, the court
has not embraced the objective theory of entrapment. Rather, in
the spirit of Russell and Hampton, it simply has placed an outer
constitutional limit on what the government may do, even to
predisposed individuals.
By clearly defining outrageous government conduct, the
Ninth Circuit has adhered to both the letter and the spirit of the
law, and has admirably performed its role as an intermediate appellate court. By adopting the Ninth Circuit's approach to the
due process defense, the Third Circuit would do the same.

